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Abstract:
In noting contemporary neglect of Mill's work on fallacy, Hansen and Pinto say that his account is
tied more closely to scientific methodology than to problems of public discourse and everyday
argumentation. This paper re-examines Mill's fallacies from a rhetorical perspective, assessing the
extent to which his examples—drawn from the domain of popular superstition, science, philosophy,
and public discussion—fits his theoretical structure. In articulating the relationship between Mill's
philosophical assumptions and the discursive practices of the fields from which he draws his
examples, it will suggest the ambiguities in Mill's mentalistic, rationalistic, inductivist approach and
the inescapable rhetoricity of his examples.
***
In their recent collection of classical and contemporary readings on fallacy Hans Hansen and Robert Pinto
include a selection from Mill's System of Logic, praising his treatment of the subject as the "first to give a
systematic account of the fallacies from an inductivist point of view" (17). They also note that despite the fact that
he "cannot be accused of giving a shallow and unoriginal account of the fallacies," (18) Mill's work has been
"much neglected by modern scholars." They speculate that the neglect of his contribution may be traceable to the
fact that his "account is tied more closely to scientific methodology than to problems of public discourse and
everyday argumentation" that have preoccupied informal logicians interested in fallacy theory. (18) If that is the
case, perhaps recent interest in the rhetoric of the disciplines, though not as salient in the field of informal logic as
it is in rhetoric, can offer exigence for a reexamination of Mill's fallacies. As rhetoricians have turned their
attention to describing the discursive practices of other fields, we may ask what such a perspective might reveal
about Mill's account of fallacious reasoning, which draws so many of its examples from scientific, economic,
philosophical, and popular public discourse. To answer that question, this essay will examine Mill's notion of
fallacy and assess the extent to which his examples, drawn from a wide range of his contemporary discourse, fit
his theoretical structure. It will attempt to articulate the relationship between Mill's philosophical assumptions and
the discursive practices of the varied fields from which he chooses his examples. In doing so it will reveal both
ambiguities in the theory and the inescapable rhetoricity of the examples. We will first discuss Mill's definition of
fallacy, then examine examples in each category of fallacy that he identifies, drawn from popular belief,
philosophy, science, and social theory.

Mill's Definition of Fallacy
Comparison of Mill's definition of fallacy with his predecessors' reveals some similarities but also suggests how
his basic notion of fallacy differs somewhat from theirs. Like Whately, whose work on fallacy appeared only
twenty years before Mill's, Mill acknowledges that even though it is impossible to corral fallacies into rigid

classification schemes, some degree of systematization is required to improve on Bentham's treatment of fallacy
as the "loci communes of bad arguments on some particular subject." (484) But whereas many of the fallacies
identified by Whately and Bentham fall into the highly contestable categories of unconscious error and deliberate
deception in public discourse, Mill tries to steer a less moralistic, more philosophical course. Unlike Whately and
Bentham, he wants to set aside indifference, bias, moral failings, hurry and inattention as sources of erroneous
opinions and professes no concern with motive or the ethical dimensions of argumentation. Mill's argumentative
world is thus more purely intellectual and less dialectical than that of his predecessors. For him fallacy lies in the
"intellectual operation of admitting insufficient evidence as sufficient (my emphasis)." (483) Sidestepping
dialogic argument or controversy between participants who are trying to sway others in the deliberative forums of
ecclesiastical and political debate, Mill's definition of fallacy focuses on the ways in which people reason to
convince themselves. It is my contention, however, that despite his attempt to remove dialogic argument from
consideration, once Mill adduces examples to illustrate the kinds of faulty arguments that people convince
themselves of, he inevitably launches critiques of actual practices and ideologies.
In addition to excluding bias and indifference as a sources of error, Mill also wants to bracket the contaminants
of will and feeling. As he says, "We cannot believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe
it." (482) And he is confident that it is possible to separate the emotional motives that make people adhere to
positions from intellectual ones: "If the sophistry of the intellect could be rendered impossible, that of the feelings,
having no instrument to work with, would be powerless." (484) The philosophical and psychological world of
Mill's fallacies, then, is one in which the rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties function independently. It
constitutes an idealized realm of intellectual inquiry, pre-dialectical, rationalistic, self-contained,
compartmentalized, removed from the world of rhetorical complexity and interaction.
Despite Mill's attempt at keeping the study of fallacy uncontaminated, the place where he introduces the subject
of fallacy within the treatment of logic suggests the difficulty of confining one's self to a wholly mental universe of
purely rational self-persuasion. Within Mill's System of Logic the discussion of fallacy occupies Book V. It
follows Book IV, called "Of Operations Subsidiary to Induction," which includes extended discussions of
observation, description, abstraction, naming, definition, classification, and the principles of philosophical
language—all intellectual operations introducing considerations of natural language use. And it precedes the
broadening out from logic that occurs in Book VI, "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences," in which Mill arrives at
the rather surprising conclusion (for a logician) of calling for the development of a science of the formation of
character, which he terms Ethology. Thus the consideration of fallacy follows the main body of Mill's logic and is
situated between the study of natural language reasoning and a call for the development of moral science. Its
position itself hints at the force of linguistic, psychological, and ethical influences on reasoning as carried on in the
philosophical, scientific, and popular discourse from which Mill draws his examples.
Although himself a powerful advocate of political and social policies, in the System of Logic Mill forges no
alliance between the study of fallacy and logic's theoretically untidy counterpart, rhetoric, and perhaps this
separation has also deflected rhetorical scholarship from the fallacies. Early in the Logic he articulates his view of
rhetoric as a purely presentational art, in contrast with the mentalistic function of logic: "The sole object of Logic
is the guidance of one's own thoughts: the communication of those thoughts to others falls under the consideration
of Rhetoric, in the large sense in which that art was conceived by the ancients; or of the still more extensive art of
Education." (3) For Mill rhetoric, the presentation of knowledge ascertained through logic, falls under the domain
of education—by no means a trivial concern in his other writings, though not one he takes up in the Logic.
Nevertheless, his treatment of fallacy implies a broader, more inclusive concept of rhetoric than the presentational
view he explicitly offers. As examination of his examples will show, attributing fallacy often entails articulating

assumptions, stances, gestures, ideologies that are not represented in descriptions of reasoning procedures. In
other words, from an Aristotelian rhetorical perspective a significant contribution of Mill's study of fallacy can be
seen as its emphasis on enthymemic reasoning. Mill's examples reveal how arguments are created by reasoning
from the "knowledge" (complete or incomplete, justified or unjustified) shared by audiences (both specialized and
general). I would argue that such reasoning has an inescapable rhetorical dimension. Thus the more we look at
the way fallacies are expressed in discourse, the harder it becomes to maintain Mill's clean distinction between
logic and rhetoric, to keep logic purely mental and rhetoric purely presentational.
After so rigorously separating the domains of logic and rhetoric, how does Mill view the function of a theory of
fallacy? For whom and for what is it useful? No logical ideologue, Mill is fully aware that "wrong inferences,
incorrect interpretations of experience, unless after much culture of the thinking faculty, are absolutely inevitable."
(481) No logical ideologue, Mill recognizes the limits of logic's applicability. He acknowledges that we discuss
many matters that we cannot be certain about and that even if people followed the principles of proof laid out in
his logic, "the number and value of the truths ascertained would be limited by the opportunities, or by the
industry, ingenuity, and patience of the individual inquirer." (481) Clearly, he is aware that the standard of
evidence required by logic is simply not attainable in much human discourse. Nevertheless, people do come to
conclusions, and that being the case, we all know that they will often leap to bad ones. Mill's theory of fallacy
concerns such leaps into belief; it points out what he considers delusions of knowledge, false consciousness of
certainty. Thus he sees the study of fallacy as concerned with inductive reasoning procedures rather than actual
arguments. It enables us to recognize the "varieties of apparent evidence which are not real evidence." He takes
as his task the analysis of "the conditions under which the human mind persuades itself that it has sufficient
grounds for a conclusion which it has not arrived at by any of the legitimate methods of induction—which it has
not, even carelessly or overhastily, endeavoured to test by those legitimate methods." (482) He views fallacious
self-persuasion as mental and internal—"the human mind persuades itself," not necessarily through social
interaction. But a perspective that is more rhetorical than philosophical flags the intrusion of the term
"persuasion." Are we to assume that self-persuasion is wholly logical, held to a standard essentially different from
other, more impure, rhetorical or presentational kinds of persuasion? Furthermore, how can we know whether or
to what extent any human mind (including our own) has persuaded itself except through its articulation of
arguments, and can we separate the representation of arguments from the internal act of self-persuasion?
As the above questions suggest, Mill's mentalistic approach to fallacy produces both gains and losses. The
separation of fallacy from dialogic argumentation allows for a more precise description of mental operations, but
at the cost of treating the procedures by which we reach conclusions in artificial isolation from discursive give and
take. Indeed, it is precisely this discursive give and take that Mill later describes and advocates so eloquently in
the treatises that have been most admired by rhetoricians, On Liberty and On the Subjection of Women. In
those treatises he argues that we arrive at truth only as a result of forging arguments that stand up to scrutiny and
counterargument in the public sphere, he exhorts his readers to imagine the responses and challenges that others
might make to their most dearly held positions, and he invites readers to challenge social and political
presumptions rather than accept present conditions as definitively establishing burden of proof. Thus his own
polemical practice and the reflection on it that occurs within his most well known treatises does not corroborate
the Logic's elaboration of a reasoning process that operates independently of rhetorical concerns.
The purpose of the following analysis is to assess Mill's theory from a rhetorical perspective, neither dismissing it
nor ignoring its inconsistencies and strains. Once we start considering actual arguments as people use them as a
basis for action or belief rather than limiting our examination to a perspective that asks what constitutes "sufficient
grounds for a conclusion," evaluation becomes complicated and the attribution of fallacy contestable. The

Perelmanian problem of adherence arises: How firmly does any reasoner "stick to" conclusions, and for whom
and for what purposes do the grounds have to be sufficient? Do (or should) scientists, philosophers, and people
who hold folk beliefs adhere to them with the same intensity and duration? Despite Mill's stature as the
determiner of "legitimate methods of induction," both his own practice as an arguer for liberty and equality and his
examples of fallacious argument suggest that it remains debatable when and which discursive practices need to
meet the standards of adequacy he articulates. When we evaluate arguments—and even when we persuade
ourselves of beliefs—we attend not only to logical sufficiency but also to all the circumstances of ordinary
discourse, with its psychological, ethical, and social complexity. Many a conclusion inadequate from the
perspective of philosophical consistency may be considered sufficiently well established to act on in a given
situation. And the converse may also hold: one may have "sufficient grounds" for a conclusion but still need to
select and express the arguments for it that will persuade a particular audience. We will see the difficulty of
maintaining a clean distinction between rhetoric and logic as we examine Mill's examples.

Taxonomy
Mill's taxonomy of fallacies differs from that of other writers on the subject. To begin with, he does not discuss at
all the troublesome ad fallacies, which, as contemporary commentators have pointed out, are often not fallacious
at all. Instead, he identifies repeated patterns of inadequate reasoning that we employ in performing the mental
operations of assuming, observing, generalizing, ratiocinating, and just being confused. When arguments go
wrong, they do so for five possible reasons, and these produce Mill's taxonomy: first, we take some propositions
for granted without subjecting them to any verification or support; these he calls a priori fallacies or fallacies of
simple inspection. Second, if we do see the need for support and attempt to observe the evidence for the
propositions we hold, it is possible to do so badly. These Mill calls fallacies of observation. Third, having
observed, we can generalize from evidence, and again do so badly or incompetently; Mill calls these fallacies of
generalization. Fourth, having come to generalizations, we can reason from them by constructing deductive chains
or syllogisms, and that too can be done badly; Mill calls such errors in syllogistic reasoning fallacies of
ratiocination. Finally, we can simply have a confused or muddled notion of what the evidence is and reason in an
imprecise manner from it. This catchall category he labels fallacies of confusion, and it includes such standards as
ambiguity, petitio principii, and ignoratio elenchi. This taxonomy possesses the virtue of logically completeness
and Mill handles it with great flexibility, never insisting on the impermeability of categories. Mill's greatest original
contributions to the theory of fallacy are, as we might expect from such a committed inductivist, his discussions of
fallacies of observation and generalization. This is where Mill's originality as an inductive thinker shows; here, and
throughout the Logic, he lays out the patterns of thinking that leads people to the acceptance (justifiable or
unjustifiable) of premises that function as foundational elements in argumentation. Less original, the treatment of
fallacies of ratiocination (or syllogistic fallacies) and the standard fallacies of confusion covers ground that has
already been well discussed by other thinkers. The major problem with the taxonomy, in my view, is that it tries
to focus on procedures of reasoning without linking them to the expression of arguments.

Fallacies of simple inspection
Under fallacies of simple inspection Mill includes not only "cases in which a proposition is believed and held for
true, literally without any extrinsic evidence, either of specific experience or general reasoning, but those more
frequent cases in which simple inspection creates a presumption in favour of a proposition ... creating a

predisposition to believe it on evidence which would be seen to be insufficient if no such presumption existed."
(485) In other words, fallacies of simple inspection are not whole arguments, chains of inferences with premises
and conclusions, but a priori assumptions that can serve as premises, sometimes unexpressed, for arguments
built around them. Aware of the metaphysical question, "What are the propositions which may reasonably be
received without proof?" (488), Mill brackets that issue, since consideration of it would require an extended
philosophical discussion or precipitate the treatment of fallacy out of logic into the world of rhetorical
contingency.
Even the examples Mill offers of fallacies of simple inspection suggest the inescapable rhetoricity of the notion of
fallacy. Actually, what Mill calls a priori assumptions, Aristotle would call enthymemes, reasoning from the
knowledge already held by the audience. Most fallacies of simple inspection are rhetorical enthymemes,
acceptable only to the extent that the assumption about what can be believed without evidence is shared by
speaker and audience. Arising from the unwarranted a priori assumption that "the same order must obtain
among the objects in nature which obtains among our ideas of them," (489) many vulgar errors reflect a naive
associationism. Mill cites as examples the belief in omens, the prohibition against speaking of the devil, and the
belief that it is unlucky to speak of misfortune. In popular discourse, these beliefs are often expressed as maxims,
that is, enthymemes whose premises are suppressed. Of course, enthymemes can be more or less good
arguments, depending on the acceptability of the premises and the quality of the common wisdom they invoke.
The strength of Mill's identification of such beliefs as fallacious is his identification of the pattern of common
assumptions; its weakness is that the philosopher's confident identification of the assumption corrects the vulgar
belief only for those who do not already hold it.
In addition to exposing popular superstitions and what passes for common wisdom, Mill takes on some
philosophical assumptions that he considers unjustified, such as Descartes' inference that geometric figures really
exist because they can be distinctly conceived, or, its opposite, the assumption that whatever is inconceivable
must be nonexistent, such as the antipodes. He also identifies some common scientific misconceptions, such as
the maxim that "a thing cannot act where it is not," which precludes belief in gravity, and the assumption that
nature always acts by the simplest means, which has been taken to mean that the most familiar explanation or
hypothesis must be the truest. He even goes so far as to identify as fallacious the principle of sufficient reason, the
claim that nature does a particular thing because we see no reason why it should not—a principle articulated in
the laws of inertia and the first law of motion. Mill sees these "laws" as circular; in his view "the real and only
proof of the laws of motion, or of any other law of the universe, is experience." (497) He points out the a priori
fallacy of assuming that causes resemble their effects, an assumption that accounts for practices in folk medicine
like using turmeric to cure jaundice because it is yellow; in chemistry, assuming that the properties of an element
resemble those of compounds; and in philosophy assuming that the mind can't act upon matter because the two
have no common property.
All of the above examples of the fallacy of simple inspection are drawn from three distinct realms—popular
superstition, science, and philosophy—and as a priori assumptions they all assume some conditions as simply
given, not subject to question. What Mill has done, in rhetorical terms, is identified the common pattern of
enthymemic argument. A rhetorical perspective might further point out that the proponents of such beliefs hold
them with varying intensity: some take folk beliefs quite seriously, while others bow to them only casually (as in
refusing to mention a no-hitter while it is in progress). Because of such differences in audience, degree of
adherence, and what's at stake, it might be argued from a disciplinary perspective that a priori reasoning in
science and philosophy differs significantly from the "vulgar errors" of folk belief. Moreover, Mill's account seems
to blur differences between the a priori assumptions of science and those of philosophy. While the scientific

assumptions of one era will often strike succeeding eras as ridiculous, the philosophic enterprise may not be quite
so progressivist as Mill's identification of "mistakes" suggests. His discussion of philosophy, like that of science
and even of popular belief, assumes a straightforward intellectual meliorism: intellectual progress results in the
gradual sloughing off of false beliefs, as we become increasingly free of error and superstition both in our
commonly held beliefs and our disciplinary thinking. As a philosophical thinker Mill himself may not be exempt
from the a priorism he identifies as fallacious in others.
In addition, despite the determination to exclude from discussion the motives for fallacy, Mill's discussions of his
examples suggest that a priori fallacies of simple inspection are not just propositions held in a dialectical vacuum.
As prejudices, presumptions antecedent to truth, they underlie arguments that he unhesitatingly labels as
disingenuous. For instance, he points out that reasoning such as Descartes' appeal to the immutability of the
Divine Nature is "nearly as common now as it was in his time, and does duty largely as a means of fencing off
disagreeable conclusions." (505) In his framing of his discussion of fallacy Mill views the motives and effects of
such an argument as separable from the reasons for its fallaciousness, but certainly he seems just as put out by it
as Bentham does at the political fallacies he describes:
But since in reality every one feels that nature is very far from perfect, the doctrine is never applied
consistently. It furnishes an argument which (like many others of a similar character) people like to
appeal to when it makes for their own side. Nobody is convinced by it, but each appears to think
that it puts religion on his side of the question, and that it is a useful weapon of offence for wounding
an adversary. (506)
As the above comment suggests, despite his avowed determination to exclude will, emotion, and sophistical
contentiousness from his notion of fallacy, Mill's commentary on his examples turns contentious precisely when
he recognizes complexities of motive that underlie the enthymemic structure of discursive give and take.
Therefore it seems fair to conclude that in his discussion of fallacies of simple inspection Mill is neither himself
free from a priori foundational assumptions nor able to isolate his evaluation of examples from the contaminant
of speculation about human motivation.

Fallacies of Observation
Mill's largest category of fallacies includes inadequate proofs of three kinds: observation, generalization, and
deduction. We will look first at fallacies of observation, which he subdivides into fallacies of non-observation (the
failure to observe evidence that might be observed) and fallacies of mal-observation (observing evidence, but
doing so badly). Like the a priori presumptions of the first category, fallacious observation is expressed not in
deductive arguments containing procedural errors but in strongly held foundational premises, and the imputation
of fallacy is subject to the same reminder about how enthymemes function in arguments. Again Mill pointedly
excludes casual error as the cause of faulty observation: "It belongs not to our purpose to treat of nonobservation as arising from casual inattention, from general slovenliness of mental habits, want of due practice in
the use of observing faculties, or insufficient interest in the subject." (507) Again many of his examples of nonobservation are drawn from the realms of popular belief and vulgar error: People (then and now) persist in
believing in almanacs as forecasters, mainly because they choose to ignore all the forecasts of events that don't
happen, preferring to focus on those that do. Similarly, people believe in sayings like "fortune favors fools," which
gets accepted as a general truth because we expect fools to fail, so that whenever they succeed we take special
notice. (This might be called the Forrest Gump phenomenon.) Casting a skeptical eye at common human

behavior, he points out that travelers almost always confirm the opinions with which they set out. Similarly, in a
disciplinary genre, historians see only what is favorable to their preconceptions. Mill's identification of the
widespread human tendency toward blithe non-observation is useful as a way of describing the common
reasoning process underlying a variety of similar cases. People do indeed observe badly and selectively, and the
charge of fallacy functions as an effective challenge to many widely held popular beliefs. However, the assumed
beliefs that Mill identifies need not exist in a vacuum. In the case of disciplinary discourse, they may be both
arrived at discursively and function discursively as premises for further arguments, and that is often more evident
in scientific and philosophical beliefs than in general popular opinion.
Non-observation similar to that which lies behind popular beliefs also appears in scientific discourse. Mill points
out that the anti-Copernicans' pre-conceived opinions prevented them from seeing what was before their eyes.
They argued that the earth did not move, because if it did, they maintained, a ball let fall from the masthead of a
ship would not reach the ground at the foot of it, but nearer to the stern. Mill notes that they assumed the truth of
what they had never taken the trouble of observing: "The Copernicans would have silenced these objectors at
once if they had tried dropping a ball from the mast-head, since they would have found that it does fall exactly at
the foot, as the theory requires." (509) Similarly, phlogistic theory was believed due to non-observation of the
gaseous products of combustion. It is relatively non-controversial to impute fallacy to outmoded scientific beliefs.
Moving closer to contested medical theories of his own day, Mill points out the willingness in popular medical
opinion to ascribe to particular medicines or to supernatural means medical cures that were really produced by
regimen, rest, or amusement. Warming to his subject and extending his frame of reference to contemporary
economic theory, he notes that fallacies of non-observation are rampant in the field of political economy, as in the
argument that lavish expenditure encourages industry (the nineteenth-century version of trickle-down economics).
This argument, he claims, overlooks the greater positive effects of investment, which are not so visible but more
widespread. In the field of economics, Mill claims that the argument against free trade is a similar case of nonobservation, because it overlooks complex indirect benefits of trade that are not so readily visible.
Thus Mill's examples of the fallacy of non-observation range from widely held generalizations about human
behavior to discredited scientific beliefs to elaborate economic and political arguments. It may indeed be the case
that, from Mill's perspective, all these arguments share the common quality of ignoring evidence, and therefore
they can all be called fallacious. But the effects of imputing fallacy differ widely, depending on the degree of
adherence with which beliefs are held. It would be difficult to get trickle-down economists and anti-free traders
to accept the imputation of fallacy and to acknowledge the structural similarity between their arguments and those
of the anti-Copernicans. The positions held by trickle-down economists and anti-free traders have been (and still
are) defended by many experts and their political advocates precisely because what constitutes the observation
of reliable evidence remains disputable both to the public and within disciplinary fields. To impute fallacy in the
arguments of a disciplinary field or a political stance, then, is not so simple a matter as pointing out the failure to
observe evidence. It is a rhetorical gesture designed to launch rather than to end an argument.
In addition to believing things on no evidence at all (committing fallacies of non-observation), people commit
fallacies of mal-observation; that is, they hold wrong beliefs because they have observed poorly. Under this
category of seeing things but seeing them wrong, Mill includes all cases where people mistake an inference for
the direct evidence of the senses. Thus people believe that we see the sun rise and set and assume that the sun
rather than the earth moves; eye-witness accounts are frequently mistaken, and—here's Mill the religious
debunker—"many a deluded visionary has actually believed he was directly inspired from heaven." (504)
Although Mill claims to be excluding all psychological and ethical causes—casual inattention, general slovenliness
of mental habits, carelessness, insufficient interest, inexperience—for non- or mal-observations, such motivations

sneak right back into his descriptions of every example of fallacious observation. The purported function of Mill's
circumscribed theory of logical fallacy is simply to identify the inferential process that has produced such wrong
beliefs. But whenever fallacy is defined simply as wrong belief, the space is left for more rhetorically oriented
explanations that suggest their sources, along with the disciplinary and psychological conditions that give rise to
them and their acceptance by various audiences. If we fail to observe or observe badly, we do so for reasons,
and it is practically impossible to keep these reasons out of the descriptions of the result. Here a more rhetorical
perspective might do more to account for skewed observation. Bacon, for instance, identifies Idols of various
kinds, and Burke's notions of "terministic screens" or "trained incapacities" helps account for their acceptance.
Linguists point out the ways in which the frames or schema we carry in our heads affect what we are able to see
or process. Studies in the rhetoric of the disciplines are very interested in such "wrong opinions" as the
assumptions of particular discourse communities.

Fallacies of generalization
Mill's chapter on fallacies of generalization is perhaps the most impressive in his entire treatment of the subject; it
is certainly his most extensive, and its description of the ways in which we come to hold generalizations in both
philosophical and public discourse stands up well. Again, he begins with his careful boxing-in of the definition of
fallacy. When "the rules are known and kept in view, but a casual lapse committed in the application of them, this
is a blunder, not a fallacy." For fallacy, the error "must be committed on principle; there must lie in it some
erroneous general conception of the inductive process; the legitimate mode of drawing conclusions from
observation and experiment must be fundamentally misconceived." (514) For Mill fallacy involves not simply
holding an incorrect proposition or premise but doing so on principle, because of an erroneous conception of
how one reasons. Although such precision of focus facilitates clarity, it raises the issue of determining in what
circumstances the "legitimate mode" needs to be employed and how one distinguishes between blunders and
genuine fallacies (and, for that matter, why one would need to). While his thoroughly circumscribed definition
allows him to focus on fallacy as a philosophically significant phenomenon, his illustrative examples suggest that
arguers in many fields and many kinds of circumstances commit similar kinds of errors that vary in severity and
corrigibility.
Under this large category of fallacies of generalization, Mill identifies certain kinds of generalizations as
necessarily groundless: all inferences from the order on earth to that in remote parts of the universe; all universal
negatives; all generalizations that resolve all things into one element. He calls all arguments proceeding from such
assumptions fallacious. This category of faulty generalization takes in the assumptions of some major
philosophical, social, and scientific theories; clearly, Mill is mainly interested here in arguments addressed to what
Perelman would call a universal audience. These are all arguments that aim at gaining the adherence of all rational
beings, "the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take
into consideration those which are not part of it." (31) Where Mill differs from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is
in his insistance that the examples he cites of fallacy be held to a strict and timeless standard of evidence rather
than the mutable appeal to "what everyone knows."
According to Mill, one of the main ways in which faulty generalizations occur is that people confuse the
philosophical principles of causality with empirical inductive generalizations. Mill points out the inadequacy of
what he calls "the natural induction of uninquiring minds," (516) noting that "simple enumeration is still the
common and received method of induction in whatever relates to man and society." Thus arise such widely held

erroneous beliefs as the assumption that Negroes cannot be civilized the same way whites are because they have
not been; that women are inferior to men because they always have been; that society cannot prosper without
some institution such as slavery, rank, or a priesthood, just because it has always had this institution; that
philosophers are unfit for business because of the very nature of their discipline. Here Mill also includes
generalizations about man and society that assume "that human nature and society will forever revolve in the same
orbit." (518) At this point he even turns his analysis on his own meliorism, acknowledging that "all generalizations
which affirm that mankind have a tendency to grow better or worse ... are in reality true or false according to
times and circumstances."
Mill describes all of these generalizations as fallacious because they are inductions without elimination. They are
methodologically inadequate because they involve no comparisons of instances, no checking on facts. At best,
they deserve the status of empirical laws, "holding good within the limits of space and time by which the particular
observations that suggested the generalisations were bounded," (517) and even at that, they are subject to
modification and correction. Here we see at work the mind of Mill the social constructionist, the cautious believer
in corrigibility and falsifiability, even of his own theories. Consistent with his notion of fallacy as false belief
resulting in particularly philosophical error, he has identified the mistaken assumptions behind many significant
arguments of his day (and of days preceding and following his). However, it may be argued that while the
assumptions that Mill considers to be empirical and thus subject to modification may be held by some thinkers as
philosophical assumptions, they may be embraced by others as casual blunders. Some thinkers have supported
(and, indeed, still support) such beliefs on principle and thus according to Mill's rigorous standards have earned
the accusation of fallacy. Others may assume them out of bias, indifference, or carelessness—precisely the
attitudes excluded from consideration as affecting fallacy. Still others may consider belief sufficiently certain for
the purposes of action in particular circumstances. Is the accusation of fallacy then merited only by the
philosophically thoughtful but mistaken? Does the disciplinary standard of philosophical adequacy extend to the
public policy arguments that follow from such premises? Is the imputation of fallacy, though directed by Mill only
at philosophical proponents who reason from inadequate principles, applicable to less methodologically selfconscious adherents who may have other reasons for adhering to such premises?
Under the category of faulty generalizations, Mill includes instances of the post hoc fallacy, which he describes as
a confusion of empirical and causal laws. Such errors, in his view, may occur a posteriori, as in the argument
that the national debt is a cause of national prosperity or the argument for the excellence of any institution inferred
from the fact that the nation has prospered under it. Such inferences identify one phenomenon as the cause of
another without sufficient empirical justification. Or the fallacy of faulty generalization can occur a priori, as in
medical theories holding that all disease is caused by phenomena such as "viscisidy in the blood" (5l9) or their
political equivalent, such as doctrines ascribing absolute goodness to particular forms of government or social
arrangements. These are examples of what Mill calls "false theory," conclusions that overrate the importance of
one possible cause. As Pinto (306) points out, Mill's examples of the post hoc fallacy differ from those of other
theorists because he defines it not so much as the assumption of causal relationship because of time sequence as
the unjustified movement from a particular to a general—thus their taxonomical slot as a kind of fallacy of
generalization. Whether a priori or a posteriori, the fallacy lies in leaping too quickly to a causal generalization.
But in all cases the error seems to be as much in the peremptoriness of the generalization as in the attribution of
causality based on temporal sequence. What is "wrong" is the over-generalized, over-simplified conclusion, not
wholly, clearly, or simply the attempt to causally connect the past to the present and future.
Mill's final group of examples in this chapter on faulty generalizations fall under the category of false analogies,
which he defines weak comparisons that do "not even simulate a complete and conclusive induction, but

consist[s] in the misapplication of an argument which is at best only admissible as an inconclusive presumption
where real proof is unattainable" (520) In his view arguments using extended metaphors to explain phenomena
often overrate their probative force. Mill does, however, acknowledge that not all analogies are fallacious; some
are apt and genuinely enlightening. But the worst situation occurs "when resemblance in one point is inferred from
resemblance in another point, though there is not only no evidence to connect the two circumstances by way of
causation, but the evidence tends positively to disconnect them." (521) As an example of faulty analogy Mill cites
the argument that since paternal government in a family works well, "despotic government in a state will work
well". Mill calls this fallacious because of what he sees as essential differences between the two elements of the
comparison: the effective government of a family depends on qualities not present in the state, such as the
affection of the parent for the offspring and the parent's superiority in wisdom. Similarly Mill labels as false the
analogy at the basis of the argument that bodies politic have youth, maturity, old age, and death. This analogy
fails, Mill says, because we die of natural causes but political bodies die of "disease or violent death; they have
no old age." (522)
Mill is certainly shrewd in pointing out that in arguments drawn from analogies and metaphors, the applicability of
the comparison is often the very issue at stake. However, his analysis acknowledges no interplay between the
probative and explanatory force of analogy. Mill's position is that an apt metaphor cannot prove, though it may
suggest the proof; for him a metaphor is not an argument, only an "assertion that an argument exists." (525) In his
view metaphors cannot prove because they assume the proposition which they are brought in to prove, and they
are useful only to the extent that they aid the apprehension of it. Thus Mill regards metaphors as rhetorical (in his
sense of the term) rather than probative, as elements that aid in presentation rather than proof, a view consistent
with his wholly presentational view of rhetoric. However, this approach does not account for the complex, often
indeterminate relationship between the invention and expression of an argument. An analogy can be the seed of
invention for an argument, or it can be used to explain the less known in terms of the better known, or it can even
help the arguer see points of comparison that would not have been obvious without the prod of comparison. It is
not necessarily "mere rhetoric," only a technique of presentation. A more rhetorical perspective might even
reverse Mill's emphasis: metaphors and analogies can be considered more or less good arguments (not bad
ones) in varying degrees, good to the extent that they can be developed, inadequate at the point at which they
break down. In Mill's examples, his disagreement is located at exactly the point he thinks the resemblance breaks
down. Although all analogies can be refuted because there is always a point where the similarity between the
elements being compared ends, refutability need not be taken as a sign of fallaciousness.

Fallacies of ratiocination
The fourth category of fallacy that Mill takes up is fallacies of ratiocination, that is, errors in the reasoning
process. Here his treatment is less original and he retreads ground covered by earlier treatises, notably Whately's
and DeMorgan's, on the ways in which the relationships between propositions can go wrong, including both
faulty syllogisms and the illegitimate conversion of propositions. But he does contribute an important observation
to the theory of fallacy. As we might expect from an inductivist, Mill expresses a good deal of skepticism about
the significance of fallacies in deductive syllogistic reasoning. Though he acknowledges that following the rules of
the syllogism constitutes a perfect protection against various kinds of procedural errors, Mill argues that such
violations are uncommon precisely because they are so easily recognized. He further maintains that because
people do not normally cast their arguments into syllogisms, they often will not easily accept a syllogistic
reduction of their arguments. In other words, the very imputation of fallacy can precipitate an argument about

how one's argument is to be understood, and (by implication) the critic may not have sole claim to the authority
to determine how an argument is to be summarized. Pushing the issue further, the question becomes, if people do
not cast their arguments in syllogistic form, what are the rules of deductive logic for? Mill defends their utility as a
kind of mental checklist, a way of revealing what one is compelled to defend in preparation for making an
argument. This discussion emphasizes Mill's mentalistic, rationalistic perspective on argumentation.
He notes, for instance, that fallacies connected with the conversion of propositions (all A are B; therefore all B
are A) are very common, though "committed, like many other fallacies, oftener in the silence of thought than in
express words." (526) Similarly, of the improper conversion of a hypothetical (if A, then B; B, therefore A), he
writes that "hardly anything is more common than for people in their private thoughts to draw this inference."
(525) But when he gets the chance to introduce his favorite kinds of examples of these fallacies, Mill seems to
find it hard to resist sliding into the role of Benthamite debunker of widely accepted public arguments for political,
social, and religious conservatism. He points out, for instance, the fallacy of people accepting philosophical
systems because they lend support to religion, morality, or politics, on the grounds that leading to what is deemed
a sound conclusion seems to be a presumption in favor of an idea. His choice of example suggests that fallacy is
indistinguishable from the wishful thinking of supporters of preferred social and political positions.
Turning to standard fallacies like the secundum quid, Mill offers as an example Adam Smith's Mercantile
Theory, which argues that since what brings in money enriches, therefore money should be attracted into a
country and kept there. He considers Smith's argument fallacious because it ignores the fact that money enriches
not by simply existing in a country but as a measure of purchasing power. Similarly, he points out that the
argument that since an individual is the best judge of his own pecuniary interest, government should not interfere
in economics is only true secundum quid. According to Mill, people will behave responsibly—i.e., they will not
take more of an available good for themselves than required—only under the condition that the responsible
conduct of others can be guaranteed, and such conduct can be controlled only by government regulation. Along
the same lines, he acknowledges that arguments that wages or prices or interest rates always find their own level
may be true, but they are true only secundum quid, under certain conditions. In such arguments, he points out,
the condition of time is too often ignored; the fact that wages will eventually find their level does not mean that
they are at their level now.
In the above examples Mill's accusations of fallacy raise the question about the conditions under which arguments
for political and economic positions opposed to his own hold as opposed to the conditions under which they can
be refuted. Although he is confident in the imputation of fallacy, it is not at all obvious that his opponents would
accept his "corrections" of their fallacious reasoning. All of the examples of secundum quid fallacies occur in
political and economic arguments that are still being defended by their adherents. Undoubtedly, they would
continue (indeed, have continued) to argue about the relevance or existence of the particular conditions under
challenge.

Fallacies of confusion
The final section of Mill's treatment of fallacy deals with less formal errors, which he calls fallacies of confusion,
where "the source of error is not so much a false estimate of the probative force of known evidence, as an
indistinct, indefinite, and fluctuating conception of what the evidence is." (530) Here, as we might expect, he
comes closest to dealing with the actual discourse of controversy. He distinguishes three varieties of fallacies of
confusion: first, reasonings in which the source of error is the ambiguity of terms, in which the premises look as if

they support the conclusion, but upon close examination can be seen not to because the meaning of a crucial
term shifts; second, fallacies of begging the question, the petitio principii, including the more common reasoning
in a circle; and third, fallacies of irrelevant conclusions, the ignoratio elenchi, where the conclusion is irrelevant
to the premises. All of this discussion is heavily indebted to Whately; indeed, Mill quotes much of Whately's
discussion at length. He does, however, contribute some examples of his own, drawn from the literature of
philosophical controversy, such as the logical puzzle of Achilles and the Tortoise, the solution to which, he says,
turns on an ambiguity in the term "infinite," confusing the infinitely divisible with the infinite in extension. Thus, Mill
explains, "an unlimited number of subdivisions may be made of that which is itself limited .... to pass through this
finite space requires a time which is infinitely divisible, but not an infinite time." (535) Here in a discipline that
insists on clear definitions as a basis for argument, Mill's analysis of fallacy is most cogent. Furthermore, perhaps
because he is retreading familiar ground, Mill seems here most pulled into criticizing the actual discourse of public
controversy rather than identifying mental errors committed prior to discursive engagement. The emphasis on the
actual discourse of argumentation is inescapable because he is considering the ways in which form and
expression contribute to the confusion created by an argument.
Other examples evoke controversies and issues of special interest to contemporary readers, such as Mill's
explication of the frequently occurring ambiguity in the definition of Theory. In "the proper sense of the word"
Mill says that theory refers to an "explanation of practice," "the completed result of philosophical induction from
experience." But "in another and a more vulgar sense, theory means any mere fiction of the imagination,
endeavouring to conceive how a thing may possibly have been produced, instead of examining how it was
produced." As in the tortoise example, it is the disciplinary precision of Mill's definition that allows for his
certainty. If everyone agreed with philosophers on what "Theory" was, there would be no argument.
Undoubtedly, however, proponents of the "vulgar sense" of theory would dispute his characterization and not
accept his judgment of their practice and use of the term as fallacious.
In a similar case, this one more related to legal than to academic discourse, Mill's remarks on the "right" of free
speech point to an ambiguity he discerns in the use of the term, resulting in a confusion frequently occurring even
today in arguments defending controversial expression. Mill's analysis attempts to clarify the debate over
controversial expression defended as a right of free speech by its proponents and attacked as irresponsible by
others:
Speaking morally, you are said to have a right to do a thing, if all persons are morally bound not to hinder you
from doing it. But in another sense, to have a right to do a thing is the opposite of having no right to do it, i.e. of
being under a moral obligation to forbear doing it.... [But] the right which you have by virtue of a duty incumbent
upon other persons is obviously quite a different thing from a right consisting in the absence of any duty
incumbent upon yourself. Yet the two things are perpetually confounded. Thus a man will say he has a right to
publish his opinions, which may be true in this sense, that it would be a breach of duty in any other person to
interfere and prevent the publication; but he assumes therefore upon that in publishing his opinions he himself
violates no duty, which may either be true or false. (536)
The argument turns on the shifting boundaries between the definition of one person's rights and concomitant or
conflicting duties. But the person who claims the right to do something will undoubtedly not accept someone
else's definition of duty. Thus the argument continues and the person accused of fallacy will persist in contesting
the ground that lies between right and duty. Mill's attribution of fallacy holds only for those who already share his
philosophical orientation; even within his field there may be disagreement.

In explaining the fallacy of petitio principii, Mill agrees with Whately that it is most often likely to occur in
sustained passages where the tautology is expressed in language that obscures the relationship between premises
and conclusion. In philosophical controversy, for example, he points out how the terms Nature and Essence are
used as instruments of fallacy: "Some particular properties of a thing are selected, more or less arbitrarily, to be
termed its nature or essence; and when this has been done, these properties are supposed to be invested with a
kind of indefeasibleness, to have become paramount to all the other properties of the thing, and incapable of
being prevailed over or counteracted by them." (530) Such an argument may indeed occur as a result of the
arguer's confusion and result in the audience's confusion, and Mill shrewdly identifies the potential misleadingness
of such easy slippage between assumption and conclusion. However, the fact that the alleged fallacy occurs in a
sustained passage may also mean that the arguer might contest the analyst's casting of the argument into the more
condensed and revealing form, thus disputing the imputation of fallacy. The problem, then, is similar to what Mill
says about syllogisms: if natural reasoning seldom appears in the form in which error is easy to recognize, the
reasoner is quite likely to dispute any interpretive reformatting of the argument. As Mill points out, "A proposition
would not be admitted by any person in his senses as a corollary from itself, unless it were expressed in language
which made it seem different." (538) What only seems different to one person might actually be different to
another. When the recognition of fallacy depends upon the format in which the argument is expressed, we are no
longer dealing with purely mental error but with rhetoric. In this case, what the notion of fallacy does is facilitate a
mental check.

Conclusion
Mill's treatment of fallacy has much to recommend it along with some slippages and inconsistencies. On the
positive side, he works from a coherent and articulate philosophical perspective. More than the approaches of
his predecessors Bentham and Whately, and his contemporary DeMorgan, his is consistently inductive,
concentrating on distinguishing between adequate and inadequate ways of supporting premises rather than on
procedural errors in linking premises. Focussing firmly on the ways in which evidence is understood, Mill is
interested in what we come to believe and what goes wrong in our coming to believe it. He is concerned with
how we reach generalizations, whether or not we articulate them in our actual arguments. But at some point the
mentalistic focus becomes a weakness. For one thing, when examining actual discourse it is difficult to maintain a
clear distinction between inductive and deductive argument. Although Mill dismisses as uncommon errors made
in the process of deduction, similar errors occur in apparently inductive reasonings, which must also depend on
usually unarticulated assumptions, whether of relevance, typicality, or sufficiency. If, for instance, I conclude that
my geraniums are not blooming well this summer because of excessive rain, that looks like a causal argument
based on inductive generalization: my geraniums bloomed brilliantly two summers ago when it was dry, but the
past two summers have been rainy and my geraniums have faltered. Certainly the evidence for my conclusion
may be evaluated on grounds of its relevance, sufficiency, or typicality. I needed to assume that the amount of
rainfall was relevant to the growth of my flowers (an assumption that most gardeners would accept), that the
amount of rainfall is a factor sufficient to bring about the success or failure of my geraniums (assuming that nothing
else important varied, like change in the composition of my soil, the time I put in my plants, the variety of
geranium I planted, my habits of fertilizing, or the attacks of marauding cats, deer, and rabbits on my flower bed),
and that my experience of three years is typical enough to warrant generalization. If my argument fails those tests,
it might be called an instance of the post hoc fallacy; if it passes them, it will be seen as reasonable. Thus,
depending on where one places one's formal template, the distinction between deductive and inductive argument
blurs: deductive arguments assume that the supportability of their premises is achieved by some other means, but

the acceptability of premises inevitably rests on assumptions of relevance, sufficiency, and typicality.
The second major strength of Mill's treatment of fallacy is its identification of patterns of inference and inspection.
The ability to abstract formal patterns characterizes intellectual disciplines and creates their special vocabularies.
To recognize a fallacy, then, is to recognize a pattern of reasoning that applies to many kinds of subject matter
across many fields, ranging from the highly philosophical to the level of folk beliefs. One consequence is that you
can only identify fallacies clearly by narrowly circumscribing what your labels refer to. But the actual reasoning
and the arguments that people make do not stay still for labelling and do not always fall into easily recognizable
forms. As we have seen, it is difficult to maintain a focus on reasoning patterns considered apart from discursive
practice, and once we start looking at discursive practice, social, ethical, motivational, and disciplinary elements
enter the picture and affect the evaluation of reasoning. That is exactly what happens in Mill's account. The
further one reads in it, the more it becomes clear that despite the disclaimers, he is looking at and evaluating
discursive practice rather than the reasoning involved in self-persuasion. Nor is his analysis exempt from the
charge of autophagia. Although he exposes the unwarranted leaps to conclusions made by others, he can only
ground his evaluations in empirical laws equally probabilistic as those of his opponents.
My point, however, is not to argue the non-existence of fallacies. To the extent that people make arguments that
can be evaluated as relatively good or bad according to criteria that are to some extent at least definable and
generalizable from one field to another, people can be said to commit fallacies. The names of fallacies, originating
unsystematically from so many different sources, do indeed describe patterns of mistakes, but we also need to
remember that these repeated patterns are the residue of many different causes and motives, impossible to
account for by formal analysis. The term "fallacy" is a catchall that has been used by many philosophers to
describe a number of different kinds of phenomena, including deliberate deception, the disciplinary practices of
forensic and deliberative discourse, corrigible mistakes, confusions, verbal ambiguities, inductive errors,
unjustified assumptions, unexamined presumptions, unwarranted inferences, commonly held preconceptions,
ideological prejudices, morally suspect argumentative tactics, rationalizations, arguments directed at particular
audiences, etc. All of these "mistakes" are intertwined in our thinking and our discourse and they make arguments
less convincing, more probabilistic. Book V of Mill's System of Logic goes a long way toward identifying and
describing many of these patterns. It must be remembered, however, that the charge of fallacy is the beginning
not the end of argument; it is a disputable claim. As discussion of so many of Mill's examples reveals, the charge
is often contestable, and reasoning that has been criticized can also be defended. The charge of fallacy, however
supportable, is not the ultimate trump card but a move in an ongoing game.

Works Cited
Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto., eds. Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings. University
Park, Pennsylvania: The Penn State University Press, l995.
John Stuart Mill. A System of Logic. London: Longmans, Green and Co., l941.
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University
Press, l969.
Pinto, Robert C., "Post hoc ergo propter hoc," in Hansen and Pinto, 302-11.
View Commentary by R. McKerrow

View Index of Papers and Commentaries
Return to Main Menu

